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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES G. CLAWSON and JOAN 
M. CLAWSON, his wife; TEX R. 
OLSEN and MONNA LEE OLSEN, 
his wife; and KEN CHAMBER-
LAIN and JEANNINE W. CHAM-
BERLAIN, his wife, '*< 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
—vs.— 
BRUCE L. MOESSER and RUTH 
ANNE MOESSER, husband and wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
James Gr. and Joan M. Clawson and others, the 
Plaintiffs and Respondents (hereinafter referred to as 
"CLAWSON") acquired record ownership of the lands 
in dispute which were at that time subject to a trust 
deed granted by their predecessors. The trust deed was 
thereafter foreclosed as a mortgage, the property sold 
and lawfully redeemed from the sale. The mortgagee in-
stituted a second sale on its deficiency. Bruce L. and 
Ruth Anne Moesser, the Defendants and Appellants 
(hereinafter referred to as "MOESSERS") purchased 
1 
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at the second sale. Clawson obtained a decree quieting 
title against Moesser on the Trial Court's determination 
that the mortgage lien could not be foreclosed twice 
under those facts. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWEE COURT 
Both sides acknowledged that the facts are not in dis-
pute and each moved for a summary judgment (R. 9-33 
and R. 74). The Trial Court granted Clawson's motion, 
denied Moesser s' motion and ordered Clawson to reim-
burse Moessers for the 1973 property taxes (R. 99-105). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Clawson seeks to have the Trial Court affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are not in dispute: 
In 1965 Mid-Continent Construction Company ac-
quired the real property (R. 44). In 1966 Mid-Continent 
and C. H. Spaulding granted to Walker Bank and Trust 
Company ("Walker Bank") a Trust Deed securing 
promissory notes of both trustors with the property (R. 
46-48). ••";;;• • -**>«**-
On November 19, 1968 Clawson obtained a judgment 
•against both Mid-Continent and Spaulding which he 
docketed in Sanpete County (R. 50). 
Clawson pursued his judgment by execution sale 
held April 10, 1969 at which he purchased the property 
(R. 50, 51). 
2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Upon expiration of six months and no redemption 
following the sale, Clawson obtained a Sheriff's Deed 
dated October 20, 1969 (R. 54, 55). 
On August 1, 1969 Walker Bank commenced fore-
closure of its trust deed as a mortgage1 (R, 52). 
The parties agree and the Court found (R. 101) that 
Clawson then held fee simple title to the land subject 
only to the Trust Deed, and! the parties stipulated to 
this priority in time (R. 56). 
Neither Clawson nor any other Plaintiff was a party to 
or bound by Walker Bank's Trust Deed or the notes 
it secured (R. 48). 
On November 6, 1969 Walker Bank obtained a 
Decree of Foreclosure (R. 15-18) which did not purport 
to determine any title other than to adjudicate that the 
Trust Deed was a paramount lien on the real property 
(R. 17). I t did not hold, and could not have held, Clawson 
liable on the underlying obligation (R. 48) nor did it 
attack Clawson's title in any way (R. 15-18). Walker 
Bank's Decree of Foreclosure was an express order to 
sell the premises and to assess a deficiency, if any, against 
only Spaulding and Mid-Continent (R.17). The sale was 
held November 6, 1969 and the premises were sold to 
Keith G. McArthur (R. 20). 
1An election permitted under Section 57-1-23, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953. :•', 
3 
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Spaulding, one of the deficiency judgment debtors, 
redeemed the Walker Bank sale (R. 24), although he 
had not done so from the previous Clawson sale (R. 54, 
55). This left Clawson with unencumbered fee title as our 
legal argument will develop. 
Spaulding, upon redeeming from Walker Bank's sale 
on June 30, 1970 (R. 24), immediately attempted to sell 
whatever he thought he may have taken from that re-
demption to Cameo Minerals, apparently a corporation 
(R. 65) from which nothing further is heard. 
Walker Bank filed a deficiency judgment against 
Mid-Continent and Spaulding on January 22, 1970 (R. 
21,22). 
Then three years later, on February 12,1973, Walker 
Bank procured a Writ of Execution — not an order of 
sale or further proceedings in its mortgage foreclosure 
—on its deficiency judgment against Mid-Continent and 
Spaulding (R. 25, 26). And it is significant that Walker 
Bank did not seek or obtain a supplemental decree of 
foreclosure or order of sale (or "special execution" as 
is provided in Section 78-37-1, UCA 1953 affecting fore-
closure of real estate morgtages) but obtained all Walker 
Bank was entitled to: a writ directed against any assets 
of Mid-Continent and Spaulding or either of them (R. 
25, 26). The sheriff executed on Clawson's property. 
At the Execution Sale of March 21, 1973 Moesser 
paid $4,100.00 for Mid-Contineinit's and Spaulding's inter-
est, if any, in the property (R. 27, 28) and recorded a 
Sheriff's Deed six months thereafter (R, 32, 33). 
4 
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Clawson paid taxes for the years 1969, 1970, 1971 
and 1972 and offered to pay those taxes for 1973 but 
Moesseiy claiming under the Sheriff's Deed, paid 1973 
taxes (E. 12) which one year's taxes the Trial Court 
ordered Clawson to reimburse to Moesser (E. 105). 
The chronology of events is critical to a disposition 
of the case, and since those facts are also complicated, 
we haye sub-joined a columnar statement of events in 
the order of their occurrence: 
% 5 
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Chain of Events Under 
Which Moessers Claim 
MID-CONTINENT & SPAULDING 
OBTAIN TITLE (R44) 
MID-CONTINENT & SPAULDING 
GRANT TRUST DEED TO 
WALKER BANK (R46) 
WALKER BANK COMMENCES 
FORECLOSURE OF ITS TRUST 
DEED AS A MORTGAGE (R52) 
WALKER BANK FORECLOSURE 
ORDER E N T E R E D (R 15-18) 
FORECLOSURE SALE ON 
WALKER BANK MORTGAGE-
KEITH Mc ARTHUR 
PURCHASES (R20) 
WALKER BANK TAKES 
DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT 
(R21,22) 
SPAULDING REDEEMS FROM 
McARTHUR (R23,24) 
WALKER BANK CAUSES 
ISSUANCE OF GENERAL 
EXECUTION ON I T S 
DEFICIENCY [Not an order of 
;ale or further proceedings in its 
foreclosure action] (R25,26) 
EXECUTION SALE ON WALKER 
3ANK GENERAL EXECUTION-
tf OESSERS PURCHASE (R27,28) 
SHERIFF'S DEED TO 
MOESSERS (R32,33) 
Date of 
Event or 
Proceeding 
Oct. 1, '65 
Sep. 8, '66 
Nov. 19, '69 
Apr. 10, '69 
Aug. 1, '69 
Oct. 20, '69 
Nov. 6, '69 
Dec. 30, '69 
Jan. 22, 70 
Jun. 28, 70 
Jul. 28, 70 
Feb. 12, 7 3 
Mar. 21, 7 3 
Sep. 24, 73 
Chain of Title and Events Under 
Which Clawsons Claim 
MID-CONTINENT & 
SPAULDING OBTAIN 
TITLE (R44) 
CLAWSON TAKES JUDGMENT 
AGAINST MID-CONTINENT & 
SPAULDING (R50) See Note 1 
CLAWSON PURCHASES A T 
EXECUTION SALE (R50) 
CLAWSON RECEIVES 
SHERIFF'S DEED FOLLOWING 
NO REDEMPTION DURING 6 
MOS. PERIOD (R54) 
SPAULDING R E D E E M S FROM 
McARTHUR (R23) 
CLAWSON CONVEYS TO 
HIMSELF AND T H E OTHER 
PLAINTIFFS (R66) 
..•'"jf/ " i * ' '.{. \'}•'': 
STote 1. One critical statement of fact in Appellants' brief requires correction. The 
ast paragraph on p. 3 contains a statement that, "On April 10, 1969, the Clawsons had 
executed on a judgment against C. H. Spaulding." The record is clear that Clawson's 
udgment was against C. H. Spaulding and Mid-Continent Construction Company 
R. 50,100). 
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ARGUMENT 
Wo do not necessarily address Appellants' argu-
ments in the order presented in their brief because, as we 
will demonstrate, the considerations in Point I following 
treat the exclusive point of significance. These consider-
ations are only discussed fleetingly near the end of 
Appellants* brief. >r r 
PQINTiI. 
ONCE THE PROPERTY HAS BEEN SOLD ON A 
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE AND REDEEMED 
FROM THAT SALE, THE MORTGAGEE CANNOT 
COMPEL A SECOND SALE FOR A DEFICENCY 
WHERE THE PROPERTY HAS PASSED FROM 
THE MORTGAGOR TO A PERSON NOT LIABLE ON 
THE MORTGAGE DEBT. 
This case involves a single issue of law. If the Court 
adopts our statement of Point I then nothing elsewhere 
in this or in Appellants' brief requires consideration. 
Every jurisdiction treating this issue in the western 
United States (where the equivalent of Utah's statutes 
on foreclosure, execution and redemption has been ex-
tensively borrowed from California's early civil code) 
agrees with the proposition we have stated at the heading 
of this point. 
! 3MV.5TO 
Utah's first code, the Revised Statutes of 1898, re-
flects in Sections 3261 and 3262 that they were borrowed 
from California's Code of Civil Procedure, Sections 
701 and 702. These sections of Utah's Revised Statutes 
of 1898, materially and effectively unchanged, are car-
ried into Rule 69(f)(1) through (4) Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
7 
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The Supreme Court of the State of California in the 
1878 case of Simpson vs. Castle, 52 Cal. 644 (prior to 
P2d), interpreting its Code of Civil Procedure, Sections 
701 and 702, held that a successor in interest of a judg-
ment debtor takes free and clear of the mortgage lien 
where the property has been sold and then redeemed from 
sale. Cited and followed extensively, that rule has never 
been modified (Salsbery vs. Ritter, 48 Cal. 2d 1, 306 P2d 
897) [1957]. 
The State of Utah, having borrowed those statutes 
after Simpson vs. Castle was decided, should be presumed 
to have adopted also the construction placed upon it by 
the Court of the author state. Donahue vs. Warner Bros., 
2 U2d 256, 272 P2d 177. See also 82 CJS p. 860, Statutes, 
Sec. 372. 
But aside from that rule of statutory construction, 
there are compelling, logical and persuasive considera-
tions of public policy which galvanize soundness of the 
Castle rule. 
The Montana Supreme Court in McQueeney vs. 
Toomey, 36 Mont. 282, 92 P 561, adopted the Simpson 
vs. Castle rule saying: 
Our code provisions are, in substance, and al-
most word for word, like those of California which 
had been construed there before their adoption 
here, and we took them with the interpretation 
placed upon them by the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia. 
The Nevada Supreme Court has been the last to 
speak on this subject and held in Kaye vs. United Mort-
gage Co., 466 P2d 848, 86 Nev. 183 (1970): 
8 
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Since Nevada statutory provisions governing 
redemption are identical in all material respects 
to California Code provisions, we are persuaded, 
as was Montana, to follow relevant case authority. 
For almost a century it has been the law of Cali-
fornia that when the right to redeem has been 
exercised by a successor in interest to the judg-
ment debtor, title is vested in such successor free 
of the lien created by the judgment. [Citing Cali-
fornia cases from 1878 to 1967]. 
This rule serves to promote one of the primary 
purposes of statutory redemption in forcing the 
purchaser at execution sale to bid in the prop-
erty at a price approximating its fair value. 
[Citing Salsbery vs. Bitter, 48 Cal. 2d 1, 306 P2d 
897 (1957)]. 
In Damascus Milk Co. vs. Morriss, 463 P2d 212, 1 
Wash. App. 501, the Appellate Division of Washington 
adopted the same reasoning and the same result. 
Oregon has developed the same conclusion in a series 
of widely cited decisions beginning with Flanders vs. 
Aumack, 32 Ore. 19, 51 P 447, holding that once a mort-
gage has operated to produce a sale of the premises it 
(the mortgage) has fully spent its force, and coming 
down to the celebrated case of TJlrich vs. Lincoln Realty 
Co., 175 P2d 149, 180 Ore. 380, which holds: 
I t has long been the rule of this state that in a 
mortgage foreclosure suit, when the decree is had 
and the property sold to satisfy it, the mortgagee 
has obtained all he contracted for. As this Court 
said in Flanders vs. Aumack, 32 Ore. 19, 51 P 
447, UA redemption will not reinstate a specific 
mortgage lien". 
9 
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The Ulrich case offers the legally distinguishing 
statement that if the real property is still in the hands 
of the mortgagor when a deficiency judgment is entered 
then the lien of that deficiency would attach to the 
property once more, with which we cannot but agree. 
However, the Court adds: > 
*• * * but if the lien of the personal judgment has 
iU, never attached by reason of the mortgagor not 
g^^avipg the fee of the property at the time it was 
rendered, there never existed any lien to be re-
instated against the successor in interest who 
purchased prior to the decree (175 P2d at p. 150). 
Neither Clawson nor his successors in interest signed 
the Walker Bank Trust Deed; none was obligated on the 
indebtedness secured thereby (R. 46-48). 
To examine the history of Utah's redemption statute 
will disclose that in the Revised Statutes of Utah, 1898, 
by Sections 3261 through 3263, Utah borrowed word for 
word California Code of Civil Procedure, Sections 701 
through 703. Those Utah sections were carried into Title 
104-37-30 of the Utah Codes of 1933 and 1943 from Sec-
tions 6941-6943 of the 1917 Revised Statutes, and have 
not been in any material way altered through adoption 
of the 1951 Judicial Code and promulgation of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure where those provisions were 
then substantially and without any change in meaning 
or effect embodied in Rule 69(e) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Thus Utah still has the old California 
Code of Civil Procedure, Sections 701 et seq. 
10 
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The landmark and consistently followed California 
case of Simpson vs. Castle (supra) draws this conclusion: 
[Discussing California Code of Civil Procedure 
Sections 701-703] 
In case of a redemption by the judgment-debtor 
or mortgagor, the effect of the sale is extinguished 
and the statute declares he is restored to his estate 
in the land, which then, for the first time, becomes 
subject to the lien of the unsatisfied 'portion of 
th^ judgment. This lifeh attaches thfen because 
the effect of the sale has been extinguished, and 
the mortgagor or the judgment-debtor is the 
owner of the estate as though no sale had been 
made. But if he had conveyed his interest in the 
land before redemption and his grantee had re-
deemed, no interest remained in the mortgagor 
or judgment-debtor on which the lien could oper-
ate unless it be on the theory that the unsatisfied 
portion of the judgment was a lien on the land 
before the redemption and the grantee of the mort-
gagor or judgment-debtor took his conveyance 
subject to that lien—a theory which finds no sup-
port in the statute, [emphasis added] 
Clawson's case is even stronger. He had acquired 
fee title before the foreclosure proceedings were ever 
commenced by Walker Bank. 
Michigan Law Review, Volume XXIII, No. 8, June 
1925, contains a learned treatise by a professor and a 
graduate entitled "Redemption from Foreclosure Sale 
and the Uniform Mortgage Act". At page 851 the authors 
observe: 
We have seen that the principal purpose of the 
redemption statute, and the only purpose which 
it serves in a superior way, is the encouragement 
11 
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of adequate bidding at the sale. Obviously this 
purpose is defeated by holding that liens are re-
vived, or that a deficiency decree will effectively 
r charge the land. Putting ourselves again in the 
position of the senior lienor on the eve of Ids sale, 
we see that he might reason that a purchase by 
him at a bargain price would be advantageous 
if no redemption took place, and that it would do 
him no harm if redemption were made by the 
owner. Furthermore, the revival of liens must 
tend to discourage redemption by the owner, thus 
diminishing the threat from this preferred bidder. 
Clearly a better psychological effect upon lienors 
would be produced by a rule that redemption by 
the owner does not revive liens but contrariwise, 
unless the redemptioner be personally liable, will 
put the land wholly beyond their reach. Nor would 
this be unfair to lienors, for they cannot reason-
ably have expected, unless the statute has prom-
ised it to them, any more than the proceeds of a 
single sale of the property* * * * 
[The senior lienor] is the likeliest bidder and 
he should be subjected to pressure to bid the prop-
erty up to its value, at least to the amount of his 
lien. Hence, his lien should be extinguished. 
In Chicago-Kent Law Review, Volume 121, beginning 
at page 202, there is a discussion of the law of Illinois, 
specifically the decision in Johnson vs. Zahn, 380 111. 320, 
44 NE2d 15. That ease holds that the purchaser of a mort-
gagor's interest (even in a purchase made after fore-
closure sale and deficiency decree) takes, upon redemp-
tion, the property free from any encumbrance by reason 
of the deficiency decree. 
The note observes that the result is not unexpected 
and is desirable from the standpoint of settled law and 
12 
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from fairness in protecting the rights of debtor as well as 
junior lienholders and, above all, purchasers from the 
mortgagor. 
In Volume 27 (1948) of the Oregon Law Review, be-
ginning at page 139, there is an extensive note and com-
ment on the effect of redemption, tracing the history of 
Oregon Supreme Court decisions. The conclusion reached 
is that even though Oregon has a statute which provides 
that in an execution sale, as opposed to a mortgage fore-
closure sale, the judgment will subsist as a lien to the 
extent of any deficiency, nevertheless a mortgage is a 
voluntarily contracted obligation and when the mortgagee 
has compelled one sale he has obtained all he contracted 
to receive. The note concludes (page 148): 
The effect of foreclosure and sale is to extin-
guish the mortgage lien; therefore, when the 
mortgagor redeems, the redeemed lands will not 
be subject to that particular lien. 
In Lightcap vs. Bradley (1900, 186 111. 510, 58 NE 
221, the Court said: 
It is true that if the premises are redeemed by 
the mortgagor they become like any other prop-
erty owned by him and may be subject to execu-
tion for sale on a deficiency; but that is because 
they belong to the debtor and not on account of 
any lien by virtue of the mortgage. A redemption 
by any person not liable for the debt would free 
them absolutely, so that they could not even be 
levied upon by execution for a deficiency. 
In Makibben vs. Arndt, 88 Ky. 180, 10 SW 642, the 
Court said: 
13 
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Petitioner (a mortgagee holding a deficiency 
judgment) contends that redemption from the 
sale left the unsatisfied portion of his judgment 
in full force against the property. This contention 
" is based upon the fact that the statute declares 
*•-• the sale "null and void" from the time of redemp-
tion. We cannot assent to it. His lien was of con-
tract. The legal title to the property was merely 
in pledge to him for payment of his debt and in 
pledge for what it might bring, merely, when sold. 
<>;* * # * he cannot sell, resell, and sell again * * *. 
The redemption is the recovery of the legal title. 
The mortgage lien ceases to exist whenever the 
sale is made enforcing it. * * * The parties to the 
mortgage contract understand at its inception that 
the property is liable to be sold once by virtue of 
it; and it is not for a court to make a contract for 
them of greater continuing force. Its right and 
power to sell is based upon the mortgage lien 
alone and one exercise of that power is an exhaus-
tion of it. 
Using almost the same language is Fields vs. Danen-
hower, 65 Ark. 392, 46 SW 938, 43 LEA 519, which makes 
the pertinent observation that if the mortgage lien sur-
vived (as Defendants here claim it should) then how 
would it be consistent for the mortgagee to have a gen-
ral execution on all of the mortgagor's property for his 
deficiency judgment, because the mortgage foreclosure 
would never be complete and there is never a right to 
a deficiency judgment until it has been determined how 
much the property will bring at foreclosure sale. 
This (the Arkansas) rule falls precisely within 
Utah's specific mortgage foreclosure procedure statute, 
78-27-2 UCA 1953, and the cases annotated thereunder. 
One such case is the 'Raymond decision which we now 
discuss. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has never been precisely 
confronted with the entire issue presented in this case, 
but on various ingredients of it which have come before 
it, this Court has been uniformly in accord with the view 
expressed by California, Oregon, Washington, Montana, 
Nevada, Illinois, Kentucky, and Arkansas. For example, 
in First National Bank vs. Raymond, 89 XL 158, 57 P2d 
1401 (1936) this Court not only held that the mortgaged 
property must be sold and the proceeds derived from the 
sale thereof applied to the payment of the obligation be-
fore a deficiency judgment may be entered against any 
of those liable for payment of the debt, but also held: 
If the property does not sell for enough to dis-
charge the debt secured, deficiency judgment 
must be docketed by the clerk for such deficiency 
against the persons liable for the payment of the 
obligation if personally served with summons, and 
execution may issue for such deficiency as in the 
case of other judgments. 
Thus, the trial court has finished its duties with 
respect to foreclosure proceedings when the de-
cree of foreclosure and the order of sale are en-
tered. (Emphasis added) 
?To require the mortgagee to accept the mortgaged 
property in lieu of the money which the mortgag-
ors have agreed to pay would be to make a con-
tract for the parties contrary to their agreement. 
This the courts may not do. (Cf. Ulrich vs. Lin-
coln Realty, 175 P2d 199, in which it is held that 
when a mortgagee has had the property sold for 
the amount of the mortgage debt and has been 
willing to accept the amount thus bid, even though 
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it might be less than the total indebtedness, the 
mortgagee has received all he contracted for in 
the mortgage.) 
The Haymond case goes on to say that provisions 
of the Utah Law are calculated to protect from injury 
the mortgagor and others who may have an interest in 
the property : 
If the mortgagee or other purchaser bids in the 
u
 property for less than its value, such mortgagee 
or purchaser may he deprived of all anticipated 
profit by redemption. 
Walker Bank, when it caused the clerk to issue an 
Execution on February 12, 1973, was well aware that its 
mortgage (or Trust Deed) had spent its force. If Walker 
Bank had been proceeding, or had intended to proceed, 
in the continuation of its specific mortgage lien, it would 
have obtained from the Court an "Order of Sale" or a 
"Special Execution" as required by Section 78-37-1 UCA 
1953, which provides, in the last sentence: 
'-;••* * * and a Special Execution or Order of Sale 
shall be issued for that purpose. 
And a "Special Execution" is an Order of Sale directed 
to specifically described property (Words and Phrases, 
Vol. 39A,p.211). 
Walker Bank was cautious to avoid any attempt to 
revive or resurrect its mortgage (B. 25, 26). 
The Federal Circuit Court case of Barry vs. Harnes-
berger (CCA 7th 148 F. 346) held in a mortgage fore-
closure case under a statute of Illinois that the lien of a 
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deficiency could not attach until the property was sold, 
that the redemption having "destroyed the lien of the 
mortgage" the lien of the deficiency judgment "could 
only attach to the property of the original mortgagors, 
whose interest in the land was terminated, of course, 
with their conveyance to the appellants". 
As all these authorities declare, the lien must attach 
to property in the name of the judgment debtor at a time 
when he holds title to the subject property. This condition 
never did obtain in the Walker Bank deficiency judgment 
proceedings under which Moessers claim to have acquired 
their interests. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT 
NEITHER SPAULDING'S REDEMPTION NOR THE 
THEORY OF CONTINUATION OF WALKER 
BANK'S LIEN GAVE THE SHERIFF ANYTHING 
TO SELL TO MOESSER. 
Since the several points stated by Appellant are all 
effectively disposed of if this Court follows the rule well 
established by the foregoing decisions, we have elected 
to treat all four of those points subordinately within this 
Point II, and as sub-headings (A) through (D), 
(A) THE FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS OF WAL-
KER BANK DID NOT DISCHARGE ANY 
RIGHTS OF CLAWSON IN THE PROPERTY. 
This misapprehension pervasive throughout Defend-
ants' brief is that Clawson was a " junior lienholder" or 
in some way a lien claimant having an encumbrance or 
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claim on the title subordinate to Walker Bank. This is 
simply contrary to the facts: Clawson was the owner of 
the land; subject only to the lien of Walker Bank?s Trust 
Deed. (See table at page 6). 
That lien was subject to satisfaction by Clawson, 
Spaulding, Mid-Continent, or by anyone else who may 
have had an interest in the land — and in any way that 
mortgages, trust deeds, or other liens may be discharged. 
One way is for the mortgage to be foreclosed and the 
property sold and thereafter redeemed from sale {Flan-
ders vs.Aumack, 32 Ore. 19, 51 P 447). When a party 
has foreclosed a mortgage and had the property once 
sold to satisfy it, he has obtained all he contracted for 
(Ulrich vs. Lincoln Realty Co., 175 P2d 149). A redemp-
tion will never reinstate a specific mortgage lien (Flan-
ders vs. Aumack, supra). Clawson and Walker Bank 
were never competing interests. One had title, the other 
had a mortgage. 
Walker Bank could only have a general execution, 
after the mortgage was totally expired. Under any other 
rule it could have no right to pursue personal property, 
supplemental proceedings, or anything else, until the 
second, or third, or fourth mortgage foreclosure aales 
were held. We submit Walker Bank had this well in mind 
and elected, correctly and inevitably, to claim by general 
execution rather than by another Order of Sale. 
(B) THE REDEMPTION BY C. H. SPAULDING, 
ALTHOUGH VALID, COULD NOT REVIVE ANY 
INTEREST IN HIMSELF SINCE HE HAD NO 
INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY. 
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When Spaulding redeemed he did so as one permitted 
by law to do so. Bule 69(f) (1) says the judgment debtor 
may redeem. One can only speculate how he intended 
to eliminate Clawson's interests; but it is certain that 
Clawson held the title and that was a problem Spaulding 
did not solve. 
However — and this is particularly significant from 
the standpoint not only of this case but also as a general 
precedent — the Spaulding redemption made it impos-
sible, as well as unnecessary, for anyone else to redeem. 
What Defendants are saying is that by Spaulding's re-
demption Clawson was precluded from protecting his 
title. That is equivalent to saying that a person who 
wished to pay his taxes to obtain the benefit of protecting 
himself against adverse possession could not do so even 
though he tendered the payment well in advance of the 
delinquency date if someone else had paid those taxes. 
Spaulding's redemption made it impossible and un-
necessary that Clawson redeem. 
A redemption by one (Spaulding in this case) is a re-
demption for all who may be interested in the title. 
The case cited on pages 12 and 13 of Appellants' 
brief further illustrates the necessity to follow local 
statutes on foreclosure and redemption and local deci-
sions which interpret those statutes. The revealing 
language in the McLean case is this: 
* * * I t thus appears that the statute and decision 
law of Iowa recognizes an equity in the mortgagor 
(who has lost title). 
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Undoubtedly Iowa has a statute which justifies such 
a conclusion. Utah, as we have pointed out hereinabove, 
clearly does not. In fact, Utah's statute compels a result 
directly to the contrary. 
(C) WALKER BANK WAS NOT A JUNIOR LIEN-
HOLDER — NO LIEN COULD ATTACH BE-
CAUSE THIS DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT WAS 
NOT AGAINST CLAWSON. 
To the extent Defendants acknowledge that Walker 
Bank had a deficiency judgment which took effect Janu-
ary 22, 1970 we are in agreement. But this judgment did 
not, and could not, operate as a lien on this property. 
As all the records show, and as the Defendants ad-
mit, Clawson was not personally bound by the judgment 
(EL 46-48); in fact, the judgment does not even recite that 
his interest is subordinate to the Walker Bank foreclosure 
(R. 15-18). Although we recognize that Clawson was sub-
ject to a sale of the property one time, and one time only, 
that sale was held and the mortgage (or trust deed) was 
extinguished as a lien on the land. 
On October 25, 1968, Clawson, who was then the 
owner of the property (his Sheriff's Deed was recorded 
October 20, 1968) stipulated with Walker Bank that the 
Trust Deed had the higher priority. The stipulation in 
full verbatim, reads: 
Come now the Defendants James Gr. Clawson and 
Joan M. Clawson and by and through their attor-
ney, Tex E. Olsen, and hereby stipulate that the 
Plaintiffs' Trust Deed has priority over any right, 
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title, or interest of said Defendants in said prop-
erty and the interest of the Defendants was ac-
quired subsequent to the filing of said interest 
by the Plaintiff. 
Beyond saying that the Walker Bank Trust Deed 
was of record when Clawson received title, this stipula-
tion says and does absolutely nothing. It permits Walker 
Bank to proceed to sell the property — but once and only 
once, as the cases unanimously hold, and if it can be re-
deemed from sale then the trust deed (mortgage) is ex-
hausted. 
In fact, under all those cases cited above and even 
those cited by the Defendants, even if Clawson had ac-
quired title from Spaulding after the decree of fore-
closure and after the sale, the title would have stayed 
with Clawson and a redemption would have extricated 
it from the trust deed. 
The stipulation does not have the effect of enlarging 
the rights of Walker Bank under its trust deed, nor of 
writing a new contract between the parties. It does no 
more than acknowledge existing, undisputed facts and 
permit the foreclosure action to proceed without contro-
versy concerning dates. 
In short, the stipulation does not repeal existing law. 
(D) CLAWSON'S INTERESTS WERE NOT FORE-
CLOSED BY ANY WALKER BANK PROCEED-
INGS. 
The cases (and text authority) cited by Moessers 
at pages 14 through 17 of their brief to the effect that a 
redemption revives the mortgage are not under statutes 
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like ours. New York is the only jurisdiction cited, and 
the principal holding begins with the language "by the 
very terms of this enactment * * *" meaning that a New 
York statute permits survival. The same is true of the 
0shorn on Mortgages citation, which begins "the cases 
holding *'* *" and ending with the New York citation. 
Defendants' Points III and IV may be disposi-
tively answered by the fact that Clawson was not a "jun-
ior lienholder". Clawson owned title. He had purchased 
it four months before Walker Bank began foreclosure 
proceedings and took a deed from the Sheriff before the 
stipulation was entered into. 
It would be repetitious to cite the many holdings 
which say a redemption removes the effect of a sale and 
title stays where it was or would have been had the sale 
not taken place. 
A mortgage foreclosure could defeat the title, if un-
redeemed from a sale, but a redemption occurred so it 
is unproductive to discuss alteration of the chain of title 
when a sale is vitiated by redemption by anyone. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully conclude this brief with the sum-
man7 that Utah's Statutes, like Montana's, Washington's, 
Nevada's, and other states', destroy the lien of a mort-
gage once the mortgage has operated to sell the property. 
Utah, as well as her sister states, borrowed the con-
trolling statute from California which had so ruled in 
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1878. All other states have accepted California's rule 
not only because the legislature is presumed to have 
borrowed California Law impressed with judicial inter-
pretation upon it, but also because those judicial inter-
pretations are sound, provide just economic results and, 
equally important, observe the law of contracts between 
parties. 
For those reasons the Trial Court should be af-
firmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Ken Chamberlain 
Olsen and Chamberlain 
76 South Main Street 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
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